Abstract. Researchers have proposed formal definitions of quantitative information flow based on information theoretic notions such as the Shannon entropy, the min entropy, the guessing entropy, belief, and channel capacity. This paper investigates the hardness of precisely checking the quantitative information flow of a program according to such definitions. More precisely, we study the "bounding problem" of quantitative information flow, defined as follows: Given a program M and a positive real number q, decide if the quantitative information flow of M is less than or equal to q. We prove that the bounding problem is not a k-safety property for any k (even when q is fixed, for the Shannon-entropy-based definition with the uniform distribution), and therefore is not amenable to the self-composition technique that has been successfully applied to checking non-interference. We also prove complexity theoretic hardness results for the case when the program is restricted to loop-free boolean programs. Specifically, we show that the problem is PP-hard for all definitions, showing a gap with non-interference which is coNP-complete for the same class of programs. The paper also compares the results with the recently proved results on the comparison problems of quantitative information flow.
Introduction
We consider programs containing high security inputs and low security outputs. Informally, the quantitative information flow problem concerns the amount of information that an attacker can learn about the high security input by executing the program and observing the low security output. The problem is motivated by applications in information security. We refer to the classic by Denning [12] for an overview.
In essence, quantitative information flow measures how secure, or insecure, a program (or a part of a program -e.g., a variable-) is. Thus, unlike noninterference [10, 13] , that only tells whether a program is completely secure or not completely secure, a definition of quantitative information flow must be able to distinguish two programs that are both interferent but have different degrees of "secureness."
For example, consider the following programs.
In both programs, H is a high security input and O is a low security output. Viewing H as a password, M 1 is a prototypical login program that checks if the guess g matches the password. 3 By executing M 1 , an attacker only learns whether H is equal to g, whereas she would be able to learn the entire content of H by executing M 2 . Hence, a reasonable definition of quantitative information flow should assign a higher quantity to M 2 than to M 1 , whereas non-interference would merely say that M 1 and M 2 are both interferent, assuming that there are more than one possible values of H.
Researchers have attempted to formalize the definition of quantitative information flow by appealing to information theory. This has resulted in definitions based on the Shannon entropy [12, 7, 19] , the min entropy [28] , the guessing entropy [17, 1] , belief [8] , and channel capacity [22, 20, 26] . All of these definitions map a program (or a part of a program) onto a non-negative real number, that is, they define a function X such that given a program M , X (M ) is a nonnegative real number. (Concretely, X is SE [µ] for the Shannon-entropy-based definition with the distribution µ, ME [µ] for the min-entropy-based definition with the distribution µ, GE [µ] for the guessing-entropy-based definition with the distribution µ, and CC for the channel-capacity-based definition. 4 ) Therefore, a natural verification problem for quantitative information flow is to decide, given M and a quantity q ≥ 0, if X (M ) ≤ q. The problem is well-studied for the case q = 0 as it is actually equivalent to checking non-interference (cf. Section 2.1).
The problem is open for q > 0 . We call this the bounding problem of quantitative information flow.
The problem has a practical relevance as a user is often interested in knowing if her program leaks information within some allowed bound. That is, the bounding problem is a form of quantitative information flow checking problem (as opposed to inference). Much of the previous research has focused on information theoretic properties of quantitative information flow and approximate (i.e., incomplete and/or unsound) algorithms for checking and inferring quantitative information flow. To fill the void, in a recent work [32] , we have studied the hardness and possibilities of deciding the comparison problem of quantitative information flow, which is the problem of precisely checking if the information flow of one program is larger than that of the other, that is, the problem of deciding if X (M 1 ) ≤ X (M 2 ) given programs M 1 and M 2 . The study has lead to some remarkable results, summarized in Section 3 and Section 4 of this paper to contrast with the new results on the bounding problem. However, the hardness results on the comparison problem do not imply hardness of the bounding problem. 5 Thus, this paper settles the open question. We summarize the main results of the paper below. Here, X is SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ] or CC , where U is the uniform distribution.
-Checking if X (M ) ≤ q is not a k-safety property [29, 9] for any k.
-Restricted to loop-free boolean programs, checking if X (M ) ≤ q is PP-hard.
Roughly, a verification problem being k-safety means that it can be reduced to a standard safety problem, such as the unreachability problem, via self composition [3, 11] . For instance, non-interference is a 2-safety property (technically, for the termination-insensitive case 6 ), and this has enabled its precise checking via a reduction to a safety problem via self composition and applying automated safety verification techniques [29, 25, 31] . Also, our recent work [32] 7 ) are 2-safety problems (and in fact, all equivalent). We also prove a complexity theoretic gap with these related problems. We have shown in the previous paper [32] that, for loop-free boolean programs, both checking non-interference and the above comparison problem with universally quantified distributions are coNP-complete. (PP is believed to be strictly harder than coNP. In particular, coNP = PP implies the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy to level 1.) Therefore, the results suggest that the bounding problems of quantitative information flow are harder than the related problems of checking non-interference and the quantitative information flow comparison problems with universally quantified distributions, and may require different techniques to solve (i.e., not self composition).
The belief-based quantitative information flow [8] differs from the definitions above in that it focuses on the information flow from a particular execution of the program (called experiment) rather than the information flow from all executions of the program. 8 Therefore, we define and study the hardness of two types of bounding problems for the belief-based definition:
Here, BE [ µ, h, ℓ ](M ) denotes the belief-based information flow of M with the experiment µ, h, ℓ where h, ℓ are the particular (high-security and low-security) inputs. Note that the problem (2) checks the bound of the belief-based quantitative information flow for all inputs whereas (1) checks the information flow for a particular input. This paper proves that neither of these problems are k-safety for any k, and are PP-hard for loop-free boolean programs.
We note that the above results are for the case the quantity q is taken to be an input to the bounding problems. We show that when fixing the parameter q constant, some of the problems become k-safety under certain conditions for different k's (cf. Section 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3).
We also define and study the hardness of the following bounding problems that check the bound over all distributions.
We show that except for (4) and (5), these problems are also not k-safety for any k, and are PP-hard for loop-free boolean programs, when q is not a constant (but are k-safety for various k's when q is held constant). For the problems (4) and (5), we show that the problems are actually equivalent to that of checking non-interference. (1), (2) , and (3) are proven by showing that the problems correspond to various "channel capacity like" definitions of quantitative information flow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing information-theoretic definitions of quantitative information flow and formally defines the bounding problems. Section 3 proves that the bounding problems are not k-safety problems for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], and CC . (Section 3.1 shows that when fixing the parameter q constant, some of them become k-safety under certain conditions for different k's.) Section 3.2 shows k-safety results for the belief-based bounding problems, and Section 3.3 shows k-safety results for the bounding problems that check the bound for all distributions. Section 4 proves complexity theoretic hardness results for the bounding problems for loop-free boolean programs for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], and CC , and Section 4.1 proves those for the belief-based bounding problems and the bounding problems that check the bound for all distributions. Section 5 discusses some implications of the hardness results. Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes. All the proofs appear in Appendix A.
Preliminaries
We introduce the information theoretic definitions of quantitative information flow that have been proposed in literature. First, we review the notion of the Shannon entropy [27] , H[µ](X), which is the average of the information content, and intuitively, denotes the uncertainty of the random variable X.
Definition 1 (Shannon Entropy). Let X be a random variable with sample space X and µ be a probability distribution associated with X. (We write µ explicitly for clarity.) The Shannon entropy of X is defined as
(The logarithm is in base 2.)
Next, we define conditional entropy. Informally, the conditional entropy of X given Y denotes the uncertainty of X after knowing Y .
Definition 2 (Conditional Entropy)
. Let X and Y be random variables with sample spaces X and Y, respectively, and µ be a probability distribution associated with X and Y . Then, the conditional entropy of X given Y , written
where
Next, we define (conditional) mutual information. Intuitively, the conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z represents the mutual dependence of X and Y after knowing Z.
Definition 3 (Mutual Information)
. Let X, Y and Z be random variables and µ be an associated probability distribution. 9 Then, the conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z is defined as
Let M be a program that takes a high security input H and a low security input L, and gives the low security output O. For simplicity, we restrict to programs with just one variable of each kind, but it is trivial to extend the formalism to multiple variables (e.g., by letting the variables range over tuples). Also, for the purpose of the paper, unobservable (i.e., high security) outputs are irrelevant, and so we assume that the only program output is the low security output. Let µ be a probability distribution over the values of H and L. Then, the semantics of M can be defined by the following probability equation. (We restrict to terminating deterministic programs in this paper.)
Note that we write M (h, ℓ) to denote the low security output of the program M given inputs h and ℓ. Now, we are ready to introduce the Shannon-entropy based definition of quantitative information flow (QIF) [12, 7, 19] .
Definition 4 (Shannon-Entropy-based QIF). Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the Shannon-entropy-based quantitative information flow is defined
Intuitively, H[µ](H|L) denotes the initial uncertainty knowing the low security input and H[µ](H|O, L) denotes the remaining uncertainty after knowing the low security output.
As an example, consider the programs M 1 and M 2 from Section 1. For concreteness, assume that g is the value 01 and H ranges over the space {00, 01, 10, 11}. Let U be the uniform distribution over {00, 01, 10, 11}, that is, U (h) = 1/4 for all h ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. Computing their Shannon-entropy based quantitative information flow, we have,
Hence, if the user was to ask if SE [U ](M 1 ) ≤ 1.0, that is, "does M 1 leak more than one bit of information (according to SE [U ])?", then the answer would be no. But, for the same query, the answer would be yes for M 2 .
Next, we introduce the min entropy, which Smith [28] recently suggested as an alternative measure for quantitative information flow.
Definition 5 (Min Entropy)
. Let X and Y be random variables, and µ be an associated probability distribution. Then, the min entropy of X is defined and the conditional min entropy of X given Y is defined
Intuitively, V[µ](X) represents the highest probability that an attacker guesses X in a single try. We now define the min-entropy-based definition of quantitative information flow.
Definition 6 (Min-Entropy-based QIF). Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the min-entropy-based quantitative information flow is defined
Whereas Smith [28] focused on programs lacking low security inputs, we extend the definition to programs with low security inputs in the definition above. It is easy to see that our definition coincides with Smith's for programs without low security inputs. Also, the extension is arguably natural in the sense that we simply take the conditional entropy with respect to the distribution over the low security inputs.
Computing the min-entropy based quantitative information flow for our running example programs M 1 and M 2 from Section 1 with the uniform distribution, we obtain,
Hence, if a user is to check whether ME [U ] is bounded by q for 1 ≤ q < 2, then the answer would be yes for M 1 , but no for M 2 .
Next, we introduce the guessing-entropy based definition of quantitative information flow [21, 17, 1] .
Definition 7 (Guessing Entropy). Let X and Y be random variables, and µ be an associated probability distribution. Then, the guessing entropy of X is defined
where m = |X| and x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m satisfies ∀i,
The conditional guessing entropy of X given Y is defined
Intuitively, G[µ](X) represents the average number of times required for the attacker to guess the value of X. We now define the guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow.
Definition 8 (Guessing-Entropy-based QIF). Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow is defined
Like with the min-entropy-based definition, the previous research on guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow only considered programs without low security inputs [17, 1] . But, it is easy to see that our definition with low security inputs coincides with the previous definitions for programs without low security inputs. Also, as with the extension for the min-entropy-based definition, it simply takes the conditional entropy over the low security inputs.
We test GE on the running example from Section 1 by calculating the quantities for the programs M 1 and M 2 with the uniform distribution.
Hence, if a user is to check whether GE [U ] is bounded by q for 0.75 ≤ q < 1.5, then the answer would be yes for M 1 , but no for M 2 .
Next, we introduce the belief-based definition of quantitative information flow [8] . The belief-based definition computes the information leak from a single execution of the program, called an experiment.
Definition 9 (Experiment). Let µ be a distribution over a high-security input such that ∀h.µ(h) > 0, h E be a high-security input, and ℓ E be a low-security input. Then, the experiment E is defined to be the tuple µ, h E , ℓ E .
10
Intuitively, the distribution µ represents the attacker's belief about the user's high security input selection, ℓ E denotes the attacker's low-security input selection, and h E denotes the user's actual selection. Then, the belief-based quantitative information flow, which is the information flow of individual experiments, is defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Belief-based QIF). Let M be a program with a high security input, a low security input, and a low security output. Let E be an experiment such that E = µ, h E , ℓ E . Then, the belief-based quantitative information flow is defined
Here, D(µ → µ ′ ) is the relative entropy (or, distance) of µ and µ ′ , and quantifies the difference between the two distributions.
11 Note thatḣ denotes the point mass distribution at h. Intuitively, the belief-based quantitative information flow expresses the difference between the attacker's belief about the high security input and the output of the experiment. It can be shown that BE [E](M ) is equivalent to self-information (for M deterministic), that is, the negative logarithm of the probability the event occurs (i.e., in this case, the output occurs).
Computing the belief-based quantitative information flow for our running example programs M 1 and M 2 from Section 1 with the uniform distribution, we obtain, -h ∈ {00, 10, 11}
And, for any h ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11},
Therefore, if the user was to ask if BE [ U, h ] is bounded by 1.0 for h = 00, then the answer would be yes for M 1 but no for M 2 . But, if the user was to ask if BE [ U, h ] is bounded by 1.0 for all h, then the answer would be no for both M 1 and M 2 . Finally, we introduce the definition of quantitative information flow based on channel capacity [22, 20, 26] , which is defined to be the maximum of the Shannon-entropy based quantitative information flow over the distribution. 11 Here, we follow [8] and use the notation D(µ → µ ′ ) over the more standard notation D(µ ′ ||µ).
Definition 11 (Channel-Capacity-based QIF). Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Then, the channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow is defined
Unlike the other definitions above, the channel-capacity based definition of quantitative information flow is not parameterized by the distribution over the inputs. As with the other definitions, let us test the definition on the running example from Section 1 by calculating the quantities for the programs M 1 and
. This is not a coincidence. In fact, it is known that CC (M ) = ME [U ](M ) for all programs M without low security inputs [28].
Non-interference
We recall the notion of non-interference [10, 13] .
Definition 12 (Non-intereference).
A program M is said to be non-interferent iff for any h, h
It can be shown that for the definitions of quantitative information flow X introduced above,
12 That is, the bounding problem (which we only officially define for positive bounds -see Section 2.2-) degenerates to checking non-interference when 0 is given as the bound.
The equivalence result on the Shannon-entropy-based definition is proven by Clark et al. [6] . The proofs for the other four definitions are given in Appendix A.
Bounding Problem
We define the bounding problem of quantitative information flow for each definition introduced above. The bounding problem for the Shannon-entropy based definition B SE [µ] is defined as follows: Given a program M and a positive real number q, decide if
14 Similarly, we define the bounding problems for the other three definitions B ME [µ], B GE [µ], and B CC as follows.
We defer the definitions of the belief-based bounding problems to Section 3.2.
K-Safety Property
We show that none of the bounding problems are k-safety problems for any k.
Informally, a program property is said to be a k-safety property [29, 9] if it can be refuted by observing k number of (finite) execution traces. A k-safety problem is the problem of checking a k-safety property. Note that the standard safety property is a 1-safety property. An important property of a k-safety problem is that it can be reduced to a standard safety (i.e., 1-safety) problem, such as the unreachability problem, via a simple program transformation called self composition [3, 11] . This allows one to verify k-safety problems by applying powerful automated safety verification techniques [2, 14, 24, 4] that have made remarkable progress recently.
As stated earlier, we prove that no bounding problem is a k-safety property for any k. (First, we prove the result for SE, ME, GE, and CC, and defer the result for BE to Section 3.2.) To put the result in perspective, we compare it to the results of the related problems, summarized below. Here, X is SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], or CC , and Y is SE , ME , or GE . (Recall that U denotes the uniform distribution.)
(1) Checking non-interference is a 2-safety problem, but it is not 1-safety.
The result (1) on non-interference is classic (see, e.g., [23, 3, 11] ). The results (2) and (3) on comparison problems are proven in our recent paper [32] . Therefore, this section's results imply that the bounding problems are harder to verify (at least, via the self-composition approach) than non-interference and the quantitative information flow comparison problems with universally quantified distributions.
Let Prog be the set of all programs, and R + be the set of positive real numbers. Let [[M ]] denote the semantics (i.e., traces) of M , represented by the set of input/output pairs, that is,
Then, formally, k-safety property is defined as follows.
Definition 13 (k-safety property). We say that a property
Note that the original definition of k-safety property is only defined over programs [29, 9] . However, because the bounding problems take the additional input q, we extend the notion to account for the extra parameter. We now state the main results of this section which show that none of the bounding problems are k-safety problems for any k. Because we are interested in hardness, we focus on the case where the distribution is the uniform distribution. That is, the results we prove for the specific case applies to the general case.
The result follows from the fact that for each of bounding problem B X above, for any k, there exists q such that deciding (M, q) ∈ B X is not a k-safety property.
In fact, as we show next, for some of the problems such as B SE [U ], even if we fix q to an arbitrary constant, there exists no k such that the problem is k-safety.
(But for other problems, for certain cases, we can find k that depends on q.) We defer the details to the next section. (See also Section 5.2.)
K-Safety Under a Constant Bound
The result above appears to suggest that the bounding problems are equally difficult for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], and CC. However, holding the parameter q constant (rather than having it as an input) paints a different picture. We show that the problems become k-safety for different definitions for different k's under different conditions in this case.
First, for q fixed, we show that the bounding problem for the channel-capacity based definition of quantitative information flow is k-safety for k = ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1. (Also, this bound is tight.) Theorem 3. Let q be a constant. Then, B CC is ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2 q ⌋.
We briefly explain the intuition behind the above result. Recall that a problem being k-safety means the existence of a counterexample trace set of size at most k. That is, for
] such that |T | ≤ ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1 such that any program that also contains T as its traces also does not belong to B CC (with q), that is, its channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow is greater than q. Then, the above result follows from the fact that the channelcapacity-based quantitative information flow coincides with the maximum over the low security inputs of the logarithm of the number of outputs [20] , therefore, any T containing ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1 traces of the same low security input and disjoint outputs is a counterexample.
For concreteness, we show how to check B CC via self composition. Suppose we are given a program M and a positive real q. We construct the self-composed program M ′ shown below.
where n = ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1. In general, a self composition involves making k copies the original program so that the resulting program would generate k traces of the original (having the desired property). By the result proven by Malacaria and Chen [20] (see also Lemma 7), it follows that M ′ does not cause an assertion failure iff (M, q) ∈ B CC .
Next, we show that for programs without low security inputs, B ME [U ] and B GE [U ] are also both k-safety problems (but for different k's) when q is held constant.
Theorem 4. Let q be a constant, and suppose B ME [U ] only takes programs without low security inputs. Then,
Theorem 5. Let q be a constant, and suppose B GE [U ] only takes programs without low security inputs.
The result for ME [U ] follows from the fact that for programs without low security inputs, the min-entropy based quantitative information flow with the uniform distribution is actually equivalent to the channel-capacity based quantitative information flow [28] . The result for GE [U ] may appear less intuitive, but, the key observation is that, like the channel-capacity based definition and the min-entropy based definition with the uniform distribution (for the case without low security inputs), for any set of traces T = [[M ]], the information flow of a program containing T would be at least as large as that of M . Therefore, by holding q constant, we can always find a large enough counterexample T . The reason B GE [U ] is 2-safety for q < 1 2 is because, in the absence of low security inputs, the minimum non-zero quantity of GE [U ](M ) is bounded (by 1/2), and so for such q, the problem GE [U ](M ) ≤ q is equivalent to checking non-interference. 15 But, when low security inputs are allowed, neither B ME [U ] nor B GE [U ] are k-safety for any k, even when q is held constant. Theorem 6. Let q be a constant. (And let B ME [U ] take programs with low security inputs.) Then, B ME [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0. Finally, we show that the Shannon-entropy based definition (with the uniform distribution) is the hardest of all the definitions and show that its bounding problem is not a k-safety property for any k, with or without low-security inputs, even when q is held constant.
Theorem 8. Let q be a constant, and suppose B SE [U ] only takes programs without low security inputs. Then, B SE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
Intuitively, Theorems 6, 7, and 8 follow from the fact that, for these definitions, given any potential counterexample
, it is possible to find M ′ containing T whose information flow is arbitrarily close to 0 (and so (M ′ , q) ∈ B X ). See Section 5.2 for further discussion. Because k tends to grow large as q grows for all the definitions and it is impossible to bound k for all q, this section's results are unlikely to lead to a practical verification of quantitative information flow. 16 Nevertheless, the results reveal interesting disparities among the different proposals for the definition of quantitative information flow.
K-Safety for Belief-based Definition
This section investigates the hardness of the bounding problems for the beliefbased definition of quantitative information flow. We define two types of bounding problems.
checks the program's information flow against the given quantity for a specific input pair h, ℓ whereas B BE2 checks that for all inputs. We show that these problems are not a k-safety problems for any k, at least when q is not a constant. To put the result in perspective, we compare to the results of the comparison problem for the belief-based quantitative information flow problem [33] .
Note that the problem in (3) compares the two programs for all experiments µ, h, ℓ . This problem also turns out to be equivalent to the comparison problems with universally quantified distributions for SE, ME, and GE discussed in Section 3. Hence, this section's non-k-safety results show that the bounding problems B BE1 and B BE2 are harder to verify (at least, via the self-composition approach) than non-interference and the comparison problems with universally quantified distributions and experiments. First, we show that B BE1 [ U, h, ℓ ] is not a k-safety property for any k, even when q is held constant, and even without low security inputs.
The 2-safety property for the case q < 1 follows because B BE2 [U ] turns out to be equivalent to non-interference for such q. The results show that the bounding problems for the belief-based definition is also quite hard, except for the case where one checks if the information flow is less than 1 for all inputs, which degenerates to checking non-interference.
K-Safety for Channel Capacity Like Definitions
In this section, we study the hardness of the bounding problems that check the bound for all distributions. We define the following problems.
For this reason, we call these bounding problems "channel capacity like." For instance, Köpf and Smith [18] call max µ ME [µ](M ) the min-entropy channel capacity. (Note that (M, q) ∈ B MECC iff max µ ME [µ](M ) ≤ q.) B GECC follows the same spirit. We define two types of channel-capacity like problems for the belief-based definition corresponding to the two types of bounding problems B BE1 and B BE2 . We prove k-safety results for each of these problems. The result below for B SECC follows directly from that of B CC (i.e., Theorem 3). But, the other results proved are new.
Theorem 11. Let q be a constant. Then, B SECC is ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2 q ⌋.
First, we show that B MECC enjoys the same property as B SECC . That is, when q is held constant, it is ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2 q ⌋. Note that unlike B ME [U ], this holds even for programs with low security inputs. We show this by proving the following lemma stating that max µ ME [µ] is actually equivalent to CC (M ).
The lemma extends the result by Braun et al. [5] that shows the equivalence for the low-security-input-free case. By the lemma, the k-safety result for B MECC follows directly from that of B CC .
Theorem 12. Let q be a constant. Then, B MECC is ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2 q ⌋.
Next, we prove that, when q is held constant, B GECC is k-safety for k = ⌊ 
Finally, we prove somewhat surprising results for B BE1CC [h, ℓ] and B BE2CC stating that they are in fact equivalent to non-interference, independent of q. It follows that these problems are 2-safety but not 1-safety.
Here, M (ℓ) = λh.M (h, ℓ). That is, the theorem states that, for any q, (M, q) ∈ B BE1CC [h, ℓ] iff the program M restricted to the low security input ℓ is noninterferent. (Note that checking non-interference at a fixed low security input is also a 2-safety property and is not a 1-safety property.)
An analogous result holds for B BE2CC .
Clarkson et al. [9] also studies B BE2CC , which they call QL in their paper.
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They state that the problem is a hypersafety property, which is a superset of k-safety properties. 
Complexities for Loop-free Boolean Programs
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of the bounding problems when the programs are restricted to loop-free boolean programs. We compare the complexity theoretic hardness of the bounding problems with those of the related problems for the same class of programs, as we have done with the k-safety property of the problems.
That is, we compare against the comparison problems of quantitative information flow and the problem of checking non-interference for loop-free boolean programs. The complexity results for these problems are summarized below.
, or CC , and Y is SE , ME , or GE .
(1) Checking non-interference is coNP-complete We show that, restricted to loop-free boolean programs, the bounding problems for the Shannon-entropy-based, the min-entropy-based, and the guessingentropy-based definition of quantitative information flow with the uniform distribution (i.e., SE [U ], ME [U ], and GE [U ]) and the channel-capacity based definition (i.e., CC ) are all PP-hard. (The results for the belief-based definition and the channel-capacity-like definitions appear in Section 4.1.) The results strengthen the hypothesis that the bounding problems for these definitions are quite hard. Indeed, they show that they are complexity theoretically harder than non-interference and the comparison problems with the universally quantified distributions for loop-free boolean programs, assuming that coNP and PP are separate. We define the syntax of loop-free boolean programs in Figure 1 . We assume the usual derived formulas φ ⇒ ψ, φ = ψ, φ ∨ ψ, and false. We give the usual weakest precondition semantics in Figure 2 .
To adapt the information flow framework to boolean programs, we make each information flow variable H, L, and O range over functions mapping boolean variables of its kind to boolean values. For example, if x and y are low security boolean variables and z is a high security boolean variable, then L ranges over the functions {x, y} → {false, true}, and H and O range over {z} → {false, true}.
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(Every boolean variable is either a low security boolean variable or a high security boolean variable.) We write M (h, ℓ) = o for an input (h, ℓ) and an output o if (h, ℓ) |= wp(M, φ) for a boolean formula φ such that o |= φ and o ′ |= φ for all output o ′ = o. Here, |= is the usual logical satisfaction relation, using h, ℓ, o, etc. to look up the values of the boolean variables. (Note that this incurs two levels of lookup.)
As an example, consider the following program.
M ≡ z := x; w := y; if x ∧ y then z := ¬z else w := ¬w Let x, y be high security variables and z, w be low security variables. Then, , and B CC are restricted to loop-free boolean programs. We also note that the results hold even when the programs are restricted to those without low security inputs. These results are proven by a reduction from MAJSAT, which is a PP-complete problem. MAJSAT is the problem of deciding, given a boolean formula φ over variables − → x , if there are more than 2 | − → x |−1 satisfying assignments to φ (i.e., whether the majority of the assignments to φ are satisfying).
Complexities for Belief and Channel Capacity Like Definitions
This section investigates the complexity theoretic hardness of the bounding problems for the belief-based definition and the channel-capacity-like definition of quantitative information flow introduced in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. As in Section 4, we focus on loop-free boolean programs.
Below shows the complexity results for the belief-based comparison problems for loop-free boolean programs [33] .
First, we prove that the two types of bounding problems for the belief-based definition, B BE1 and B BE2 , are both PP-hard. 
Discussion

Bounding the Domains
The notion of k-safety property, like the notion of safety property from where it extends, is defined over all programs regardless of their size. (For example, non-interference is a 2-safety property for all programs and unreachability is a safety property for all programs.) But, it is easy to show that the bounding problems would become "k-safety" properties if we constrained and bounded the input domains because then the size of the semantics (i.e., the input/output pairs) of such programs would be bounded by |H|×|L|. In this case, the problems are at most |H|×|L|-safety. (And the complexity theoretic hardness degenerates to a constant.) But, like the k-safety bounds obtained by fixing q constant (cf. Section 3.1), these bounds are high for all but very small domains and are unlikely to lead to a practical verification method. Also, because a bound on the high security input domain puts a bound on the maximum information flow, the bounding problems become a tautology for q ≥ c, where c is the maximum information flow for the respective definition.
Low Security Inputs
Recall the results from Section 3.1 that, under a constant bound, the bounding problems for both the min-entropy based definition and the guessing-entropy based definition with the uniform distribution are k-safety for programs without low security inputs, but not for those with. The reason for the non-k-safety results is that the definitions of quantitative information flow ME and GE (and in fact, also SE ) use the conditional entropy over the low security input distribution and are parameterized by the distribution. This means that the quantitative information flow of a program is averaged over the low security inputs according to the distribution. Therefore, by arbitrarily increasing the number of low security inputs, given any set of traces T , it becomes possible to find a program containing T whose information flow is arbitrarily close to 0 (at least under the uniform distribution). This appears to be a property intrinsic to any definition of quantitative information flow defined via conditional entropy over the low security inputs and is parameterized by the distribution of low security inputs. Note that the channel-capacity-like definitions do not share this property as it is defined to be the maximum over the distributions. The non-k-safety result for B SE [U ] holds even in the absence of low security inputs because the Shannon entropy of a program is the average of the surprisal [8] of the individual observations, and so by increasing the number of high security inputs, given any set of traces T , it becomes possible to find a program containing T whose information flow is arbitrarily close to 0. The non-k-safety results for B BE1 [ U, h ] and B BE2 [U ] hold for similar reasons.
Related Work
This work continues our recent research [32] on investigating the hardness and possibilities of verifying quantitative information flow according to the formal definitions proposed in literature [8, 12, 7, 19, 28, 17, 1, 22, 20, 26, 5, 18] . Much of the previous research has focused on information theoretic properties of the definitions and proposed approximate (i.e., incomplete and/or unsound) methods for checking and inferring quantitative information flow according to such definitions. In contrast, this paper (along with our recent paper [32]) investigates the hardness and possibilities of precisely checking and inferring quantitative information flow according to the definitions. This paper has shown that the bounding problem, that is, the problem of checking X (M ) ≤ q given a program M and a positive real q, is quite hard (for various quantitative information flow definitions X ). This is in contrast to our previous paper that has investigated the hardness and possibilities of the comparison problem, that is, the problem of checking X (M 1 ) ≤ X (M 2 ) given programs M 1 and M 2 . To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the hardness of the bounding problems. But, the hardness of quantitative information flow inference, a harder problem, follows from the results of our previous paper, and Backes et al. [1] and also Heusser and Malacaria [15] have proposed a precise inference method that utilizes self composition and counting algorithms. Also, independently from our work, Heusser and Malacaria [16] have recently applied the self-composition method outlined in Section 3.1 for checking the channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have formalized and proved the hardness of the bounding problem of quantitative information flow, which is a form of (precise) checking problem of quantitative information flow. We have shown that no bounding problem is a k-safety property for any k, and therefore that it is not possible to reduce the problem to a safety problem via self composition, at least when the quantity to check against is unrestricted. The result is in contrast to non-interference and the quantitative information flow comparison problem with universally quantified distribution, which are 2-safety properties. We have also shown a complexity theoretic gap with these problems, which are coNP-complete, by proving the PP-hardness of the bounding problems, when restricted to loop-free boolean programs.
We have also shown that the bounding problems for some quantitative information flow definitions become k-safety for different k's under certain conditions when the quantity to check against is restricted to be a constant, highlighting interesting disparities among the different definitions of quantitative information flow.
It is interesting to note that, as with the comparison problems, the bounding problems become comparatively easier when the input distribution becomes universally quantified. That is, as our previous work [32] has shown that checking if 
A Proofs
We define some abbreviations.
We use the above notation whenever the correspondences between random variables and their values are clear. We define some useful abbreviations for programs having low security inputs.
Note that M (ℓ) is the program M restricted to the low security input ℓ, and that M [H, ℓ] is the set of outputs of M (ℓ).
We elide the parameter q from the input to the bounding problems when it is clear from the context (e.g., when q is held constant). For example, we write
We note the following properties of deterministic programs [6] .
Lemma 4. Let M be a program without low-security inputs, M ′ be a program with low-security inputs. Then, we have SE
Definition 17.
Intuitively, In(µ, X, x) is the order of x defined in terms of µ.
Lemma 5.
Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 1. Let µ be a belief, h E be a high-security input, ℓ E be a low-security
Proof. By definition, we have
-SE (See [6] .)
-ME • ⇒ Suppose M is non-interferent. By the definition, it suffices to show that
We have for any ℓ x and o x such that µ(
and for all h y , ℓ y , and o y such that µ(h y , ℓ y , o y ) > 0, for any h
• ⇐ We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. That is, there exist h 1 , h 2 , and ℓ
where A = ℓ∈L\{ℓ ′ } max h µ(h, ℓ). And,
We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. That is, there exist h 1 , h 2 , and ℓ
Trivially, we have A ≥ B and
Suppose M is non-interferent. By Lemma 1, for any µ, h, and ℓ,
Then, by Lemma 1, we have for any h,
We note the following equivalence of CC and ME[U] for programs without low security inputs [28].
Lemma 6. Let M be a program without low security input. Then, CC (M ) = ME [U ](M ).
, nor B CC is a k-safety property for any k such that k > 0.
Proof.
is not a k-safety problem for any k such that k > 0.
Trivial by Theorem 8.
is not a k-safety property for any k such that k > 0.
Trivial by Theorem 4.
Trivial by Theorem 5. -B CC is not a k-safety property for any k such that k > 0.
Trivial from Lemma 6 and the fact that B ME [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k.
Malacaria and Chen [20] have proved the following result relating the channelcapacity based quantitative information flow with the number of outputs.
Lemma 7. Let M be a program (with low security input). Then,
Proof. We prove that B CC is ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1-safety. Let M be a program such that M ∈ B CC . By Lemma 7, it must be the case that there exists ℓ such that
q ⌋ + 1, and for all ((h, ℓ ′ ), o) ∈ T , ℓ ′ = ℓ. Then, by Lemma 7, it follows that for any program 
Then, we have
. Therefore, this leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 4. Let q be a constant, and suppose B ME [U ] only takes programs without low security inputs. Then, B ME [U ] is ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not ksafety for any k ≤ ⌊2 q ⌋.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 3 and Lemma 6.
Lemma 8. Let M be a program without low security inputs. Then, we have
where n is the number of inputs, and
Proof. By the definition, we have
Proof. We prove
By Lemma 8, we have 
Hence, we have
That is, when M has exactly two outputs. Therefore, it suffices to prove the lemma for just such M 's. Now, we prove
Because n is an integer, we have n ≤ ⌊ 
Proof. Let q ≥ 
By Lemma 10, we have |T | ≤ ⌊ = q(
The last line follows from
Otherwise, we have ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1) 
. Therefore, this leads to a contradiction. Next, we prove that B GE [U ] is 2-safety for any q < . It suffices to show that GE [U ](M ) ≤ q iff M is non-interferent, because non-interference is a 2-safety property and not a 1-safety property [23, 3, 11] . We prove that if GE [U ](M ) ≤ q then M is non-interferent. The other direction follows from Theorem 1. We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. It must be the case that there exist h and h
. By Lemma 9, we have
Lemma 12. Let M be a program that has a low-security input, a high-security input, and a low-security output. Then, we have
and L is sample space of the low-security input.
Proof. By the definition of ME , we have
It follows that ((h 1 , ℓ 1 ), o 1 ) , . . . , ((h i , ℓ i ) , o i )}. LetM be the following program.
where n = |H||L|, andH,L are the high security inputs and the low security inputs ofM . Then, by Lemma 12, we have
Therefore, for any q > 0, there existsL such that
Therefore, this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 13. Let M be a program that has a high-security input with sample space H, a low-security input with sample space L, and a low-security output. Then, we have
Proof. By the definition, we have 
where n = |H| and m = |L|, andH,L are the high security inputs and the low security inputs ofM . Then, by Lemma 13, we have
Therefore, this leads to a contradiction. 
It follows that there exists n such that BE [ U, h ](M ) ≤ q. This leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, it suffices to show that This leads to a contradiction. Next, we prove that B BE2 [U ] is a 2-safety property for any q < 1. It suffices to show that ∀h, ℓ.BE [ U, h, ℓ ](M ) ≤ q iff M is non-interferent, because noninterference is a 2-safety property and is not a 1-safety property [23, 3, 11] . We prove that if ∀h, ℓ.BE [ U, h, ℓ ](M ) ≤ q then M is non-interferent. The other direction follows from Theorem 1. We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. It must be the case that there exist h 0 , h 1 , and ℓ ′ such that It follows that ¬(∀h, ℓ.BE [ U, h, ℓ ] ≤ q).
Proof. Trivial from Theorem 3 and the fact that B SECC is equivalent to B CC . Proof. The statement was proved for programs without low security inputs by Braun et al. [5] . We show that the same result holds for programs with low security inputs. Let ℓ ′ be a low-security input such that for any ℓ, m ℓ ′ ≥ m ℓ where m ℓ0 = |M [H, ℓ 0 ]|. Let µ ′ be a distribution such that ∀h.µ ′ (h, ℓ ′ ) = 1 n where n is the number of high-security inputs. We have CC (M ) = ME [µ ′ ](M ) = log m ℓ ′ . Therefore, it suffices to show that for any µ, ME Theorem 12. Let q be a constant. Then, B MECC is ⌊2 q ⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2 q ⌋.
Proof. Trivial by Theorem 3 and Lemma 2.
We define the "normal form" of the guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow expression. Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 14 and the fact that a program M is noninterferent iff for all ℓ, M (ℓ) is non-interferent.
